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Metaphysical considerations suggest that to be a serious candidate for 
describing actuality, a spacetime should be maximal. For example, for the 
Creative Force to actualize a proper subpart of a larger spacetime would 
seem to be a violation of Leibniz’s principles of sufficient reason and 
plenitude. If one adopts the image of spacetime as being generated or built 
up as time passes then the dynamical version of the principle of sufficient 
reason would ask why the Creative Force would stop building if it is possible 
to continue. (...) Some readers may be shocked by the introduction of 
metaphysical considerations in the hardest of the “hard sciences.” But in 
fact leading workers in relativistic gravitation, though they don’t invoke the 
name of Leibniz, are motivated by such principles (see, for example, Geroch 
1970, p. 262; Penrose 1969, p. 253). 
John Earman1 
 
1. Introduction 
We can distinguish between two fundamental questions about explanation. The first one, “What is 
explanation?”, may be called the General Explanation Question. The second one, “Under what 
circumstances do truths have an explanation?”, may be called the Special Explanation Question. An 
answer to the General Explanation Question may take two forms. It may take the form of an 
analysis of the notion of explanation or it may consist in an axiomatic theory that articulates the 
most general principles about explanation. On the other hand, the Special Explanation Question is 
the demand for necessary and jointly sufficient conditions any truth must satisfy in order for it to be 
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the case that it has an explanation. Within the past few years, there has been a growing body of 
philosophical literature concerning the General Explanation Question. By contrast, I think that it is 
fair to say that the Special Explanation Question, with which this paper is concerned, has received 
less attention. 
The distinction between the General and the Special Explanation Questions should be 
reminiscent of Peter van Inwagen’s (1990) famous distinction between the General Composition 
Question (What is composition?) and the Special Composition Question (When does composition 
occur?). The analogy is intended to suggest that there are three general answers to the Special 
Explanation Question: always, never, and sometimes. I call explanatory universalism the first of 
these answers. According to explanatory universalism, truths have an explanation under every 
circumstance. In other words, explanatory universalism is the view that the early modern rationalist 
principle of sufficient reason (hereafter, PSR) is true:  
 
PSR: For any proposition x, if x is true then there is a proposition y such that y explains x.2 
 
The second answer to the Special Explanation Question may be called explanatory nihilism. It is the 
view that every truth is brute, i. e. unexplained. According to the third answer to the Special 
Explanation Question, explanation is restricted to a certain class of truths, which means that some 
truths have an explanation while others are brute.  
I believe that answers to the Special Explanation Question deserve the attention of 
philosophers. First, these theses have consequences about answers to what we may call applied 
explanation questions. Roughly, an applied explanation question is a question of the form “What 
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 Here I follow other authors in interpreting PSR as a principle about explanation; see e.g. Della Rocca 2010, p.1, Meyer 
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distinguishing this from other answers to the Special Explanation Question. Moreover, “rationalism” connotes 
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explains what?”—or “What is more fundamental than what?” Applied explanation questions play 
central roles in various fields of inquiry. Some have recently argued that one of the most central 
questions of metaphysics is “What metaphysically explains what?” or “What grounds what?”3 On 
the other hand, a fundamental question of physics is arguably “What physically explains what?”4 
The Special Explanation Question can rightly be regarded as metametaphysical in the sense that 
answers to this question have methodological implications about the way we answer applied 
explanation questions. For instance, it seems that one must believe that explanatory nihilism is false 
in order to be justified in maintaining that there is a non-vacuous answer to applied explanation 
questions. Furthermore, it has become a common practice in philosophy to claim that some specific 
phenomenon is brute or unexplained—e.g. truth, composition, resemblance, naturalness, etc. 
Brutalist strategies seem to rely on the assumption that admitting that some truths have no 
explanation is permitted in some circumstances. Yet one may wonder whether there are such 
circumstances and what they are. But this means engaging with the Special Explanation Question.5  
Second, answers to the Special Explanation Question may appear to conflict with general 
principles about explanation, as the following discussion shall illustrate. Yet if some of our beliefs 
about the correct answer to the Special Explanation Question conflict with some of our beliefs 
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phenomena? For instance, big bang theory has been judged superior to the steady state theory because it provides an 
explanation for the cosmic microwave background radiation. 
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 Notice that if we assume that there are several species of explanation, e. g. metaphysical, physical, and biological 
explanations, then we can distinguish between species of the Special Explanation Question: in which circumstances 
does metaphysical explanation arise? In which circumstances does physical explanation arise? Etc. Different answers to 
these questions are compatible.  For instance, one may endorse explanatory universalism about physical explanation—
each truth that represents a state of the universe has a physical explanation—and explanatory nihilism about 
metaphysical explanation—metaphysical explanation never takes place. In this article, I shall not commit myself to any 
particular view about species of explanation because my focus is on the genus: explanation. But notice that sometimes it 
seems wrong to interpret a brutalist claim as the claim that some truth has no explanation tout court. Sometimes such 
claims are better interpreted as meaning that some facts lack a certain species of explanation. For instance, a nominalist 
who takes the resemblance of red particulars as being brute only intends to claim that this fact has no further 
metaphysical explanation. Her intention, however, is not to claim that there is no physical explanation of the 
resemblance of red particulars. 
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about general principles about explanation, some of these beliefs have to be revised. I believe that 
there is no good ground to assume a priori that our beliefs about which general principles about 
explanation are true are more immune to revision than our beliefs about answers to the Special 
Explanation Question.6 Thus investigating possible conflicts between answers to the General and 
the Special Explanation Questions seems to be a good place to start developing a reasoned picture 
of the explanatory structure of the world.  
This article is a modest contribution to this programme as its focus is on explanatory 
universalism. Explanatory universalism corresponds to the traditional doctrine according to which 
PSR is true, a doctrine that has been held by philosophers like Aquinas, Spinoza, and Leibniz 
among others. Despite its impressive intellectual pedigree, PSR is routinely dismissed as an 
unsupported metaphysical dogma. However, I share the early modern rationalists’ warm feelings 
towards PSR. For explanatory universalism is an intuitive and elegant doctrine. When asked to 
answer a meaningful why-question, our natural attitude is always to think that this question is in 
principle answerable, even if it may be impossible for us to know its answer. Of course, why-
questions are sometimes vexing, and frustration may lead us to entertain the possibility of the 
question being unanswerable. But if the question truly makes sense, and if there really is a fact of 
the matter about the truth of the explanandum, then it seems to me very difficult to admit that such a 
truth just emerged out of nothing. Michael Della Rocca (2010) has recently argued that proponents 
of the restricted answer to the Special Explanation Question must provide a principled account of 
why inexplicability is sometimes acceptable while in most cases it isn’t. Like him, I think that in the 
absence of such an account the division between explained and brute truths appears incomplete. For 
the absence of such an account means that proponents of a restricted answer to the Special 
Explanation Question fail to provide necessary and jointly sufficient conditions any truth must 
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satisfy in order for it to be the case that it has an explanation. By contrast, explanatory universalism 
provides a unified picture of the explanatory structure of the universe. Moreover, it seems that 
science, throughout its history, has developed under the fruitful working hypothesis that what 
happens in the world must be explicable. And as the opening quotation from John Earman (1995) 
suggests, PSR may play an important role in discriminating cosmological models that are good 
candidates for describing reality.7 
This article is going to defend explanatory universalism from a simple and direct valid 
argument according to which PSR has the consequence that there is a truth that explains every truth, 
namely an omni-explainer. I shall describe this argument in section 2. I have no doubt that 
opponents to PSR would agree that this argument challenges explanatory universalism. For the 
claim that there is an omni-explainer is counterintuitive on its face. But I suspect that several 
explanatory universalists may be willing to endorse the conclusion that, if PSR is true, then there is 
an omni-explainer. My purpose in section 3 is to explain why explanatory universalists should not 
endorse the strategy that consists in biting the bullet in favour of the existence of an omni-explainer. 
The reason why biting the bullet in favour of an omni-explainer is wrong is that the existence of an 
omni-explainer conflicts with the principle that explanation is irreflexive. Section 3 is thus a 
defence of the principle that explanation is irreflexive that consists of two steps. First, on the 
assumption that PSR yields that there is an omni-explainer, the most natural and plausible way to 
relax the principle of irreflexivity of explanation yields a counterintuitive doctrine, namely 
necessitarianism. Second, general considerations on explanation support the view that no further 
way of relaxing the ban on self-explanations is warranted. So, in light of my defence of the 
irreflexivity of explanation, the argument according to which PSR implies that some truth explains 
all truths constitutes a powerful argument against explanatory universalism. But, in section 4, I shall 
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argue that explanatory universalists can resist this argument. For it relies on an assumption that 
explanatory universalists can legitimately reject, namely the assumption that explanation distributes 
over conjunction. In the final section, I consider a plausible revision of this assumption. I argue 
there that, given the revised assumption, explanatory universalism seems to yield a striking picture 
of the explanatory structure of the universe. I shall indicate why the resulting model does not appear 
utterly implausible to me. 
 
 
2. Explaining all truths 
Explanatory universalists maintain that whatever is the case has a sufficient reason for its being the 
case, hence that PSR is true. Early modern rationalists have suspected that we can derive from this 
principle that there is a sufficient reason for whatever is the case. Given my understanding of PSR 
in terms of explanation, the claim that there is a sufficient reason for whatever is the case amounts 
to the thesis that there is an omni-explainer: 
 
Omni-explainer: there is a true proposition x such that, for any proposition y, if y is true, then x 
explains y.  
 
One may expect an argument from PSR to the thesis that there is an omni-explainer to involve a 
quantifier shift fallacy or some strong assumptions about the explanatory structure of the universe. 
But no, there is a simple and direct valid argument from PSR to the thesis that some truth explains 
every truth that only appeals to the assumption that explanation is dissective: 
 
Dissection: For any propositions x, y, and z, if z is an explanation for (x & y), then z is an 
explanation for x and z is an explanation for y. 
 
Dissection is a corollary of the claim that explanation is monotonic, i.e. the claim that any 
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explanans explains all the logical consequences of what it explains.8 There are powerful reasons to 
deny monotonicity that are independent of whether Dissection is true, however (see below section 
4). But my appeal to the claim that explanation is dissective here is motivated by the fact that most 
authors in the contemporary literature about PSR appear to endorse this claim.9  
An interesting variation on the notion of an omni-explainer is that of collective omni-
explainers: for any propositions x1, …, xn …, x1, …, xn … are collective omni-explainers when 
whatever is the case is explained to be the case by one or the other of x1, …, xn …. The notion of 
collective omni-explainers is worthy of attention because the claim that there are collective omni-
explainers directly follows from PSR: if every truth has an explanation, then there are true 
propositions x1, …, xn … such that whatever is the case is explained to be the case by one or the 
other of them. The logical link between PSR and the thesis that there are collective omni-explainers 
is the ground for the argument called to attention here.10  
Roughly, the argument runs as follows. If we assume for reductio that there are collective 
omni-explainers but no omni-explainer tout court, then we can map each of the collective omni-
explainers onto a true proposition that it does not explain. Then if we form the conjunction of these 
mapped-to propositions, it follows from the claim that some truths collectively explain all truths 
that some of the collective omni-explainers, call it O, explains this conjunction. However, given 
Dissection, if O explains the conjunction of mapped-to propositions, O explains each of its 
conjuncts too. But this leads straight to a contradiction. For given the assumption that there is no 
omni-explainer tout court, there has to be a truth that O does not explain, and this truth has to be a 
conjunct of the conjunction of mapped-to propositions. But, given Dissection, O explains each of 
the conjuncts of this conjunction. So by reductio if explanation is assumed to be dissective, the 
                                                          
8
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 These authors include van Inwagen (1983), Bennett (1984), Hudson (1997), Pruss (2006), Oppy (2006), Della Rocca 
(2010), and Meyer (2012). 
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claim that there are collective omni-explainers yields the conclusion that there is an omni-explainer 
tout court. Since PSR entails that there are collective omni-explainers we can conclude that PSR 
entails that there is an omni-explainer tout court. 
Here is a more precise statement of the argument. For expository purposes, I make the over-
simplified assumption that the set of collective omni-explainers contains only two propositions: r 
and s.11 So on the assumption that r and s are collective omni-explainers, every truth is either 
explained by r or by s. Suppose for reductio that neither r nor s is an omni-explainer tout court. 
Then to each of our collective omni-explainers there corresponds some true proposition that it does 
not explain. So using the indexed modal operator ‘Er’ to mean ‘r explains’, for some proposition p, 
it is the case that  
 
(1) p & ¬Erp 
 
read as “p is true and r does not explain p”. Likewise, using the indexed modal operator ‘Es’ to 
mean ‘s explains’, for some proposition q, it is the case that 
 
(2) q & ¬Esq 
 
read as “q is true and s does not explain q”. Then forming the conjunction of the first conjunct of (1) 
with the first conjunct of (2) we obtain the antecedent of (3) 
 
(3) (p & q)  (Er(p & q)  Es(p & q)), 
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 The argument generalises in a straightforward way to any finite number n ≥ 2 of collective omni-explainers, as the 
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which is an instance of the claim that r and s collectively explain all truths: if the conjunction of p 
and q is true, then either r or s explains it as they collectively explain all truths. The antecedent of 
(3), namely (p & q), follows from (1) and (2). So by modus ponens we are entitled to derive the 
consequent of (3). However, given Dissection, the consequent of (3) is inconsistent with the 
conjunction of (1) and (2). For by Dissection the first disjunct of the consequent of (3) entails that r 
explains p, which contradicts (1), and its second disjunct entails that s explains q, which contradicts 
(2). So by reductio either r explains every truth or s does.  
This argument can be reconstructed in a bimodal logic of the two operators ‘Er’ and ‘Es’ as a 
derivation of ‘(p Erp) q Esq)’ from (3): 
(3) (p & q)  (Er(p & q)  Es(p & q)) 
(4) Er(p & q)  Erp   by Dissection applied to (p & q) 
(5) Es(p & q)  Esq   by Dissection applied to (p & q) 
(6) (p & q)  (Erp  Esq)   a truth-functional consequence of (3), (4), and (5) 
(7) (p  Erp)  (q  Esq)   a truth-functional equivalence of (6). 
 
Since (7) entails that either (1) or (2) is false, its import is that either r explains every truth or s 
does, hence that there is an omni-explainer tout court. I should emphasise that none of the disjuncts 
of (7) can be deduced from (3). Letting ‘O’ name an omni-explainer tout court, we do not know 
whether O = r or O = s. In general, each of the collective omni-explainers is an equally good 
candidate to be an omni-explainer tout court, and there may be several of them. 
So, given Dissection, PSR entails that there is an omni-explainer. Explanatory universalists 
endorse PSR. So, if Dissection is true, explanatory universalists are committed to the existence of 
an omni-explainer, namely a truth that explains every truth. I have no doubt that opponents of PSR 
would regard this argument as a weighty objection to explanatory universalism. For the claim that 
there is an omni-explainer is counterintuitive. But I am less certain that every proponent of PSR will 
appreciate the strength of this argument. For, as I emphasised at the beginning of this section, the 
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thesis that there is a sufficient reason for whatever is the case is a thesis classical explanatory 
universalists intended to demonstrate and defend. So the purpose of the next section is to explain 
why I think that explanatory universalists should not welcome the result that PSR entails that there 
is an omni-explainer. The reason why they should not welcome this result is that the existence of an 
omni-explainer conflicts with the principle that explanation is irreflexive, which I shall defend. 
Some philosophers, both among opponents and proponents of PSR, have thought that some specific 
failures of this principle are admissible. My task in the next section is to argue that these 
philosophers are wrong. If I am right, there is no refuge for explanatory universalists in allowing for 
failures of the principle that explanation is irreflexive. So while the conclusion of the present 
section is that explanatory universalism has a counterintuitive consequence—namely, that there is 
an omni-explainer—if Dissection is true, the conclusion of the next section shall be that explanatory 
universalists are in serious troubles if Dissection is true. This is the reason why Dissection will be 
the focus of section 4. 
  
3. PSR and the ban on self-explanations 
I believe that the strongest reason to resist the claim that there is an omni-explainer is that this claim 
contradicts the seemingly undeniable principle that explanation is irreflexive: 
 
Irreflexivity: For any propositions x and y, if x is an explanation for y, then x ≠ y. 
 
The claim that explanation is irreflexive is inconsistent with the claim that there is an omni-
explainer because an omni-explainer explains every truth including itself. So if PSR entails that 
there is an omni-explainer, it also entails that explanation is not irreflexive. The deduction of an 
omni-explainer from PSR exhibits an apparent conflict between PSR and the principle that 
explanation is irreflexive.  
Several authors of the tradition have suspected that PSR yields a commitment to the view that 
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something is its own sufficient reason, hence that PSR conflicts with Irreflexivity. But what they 
have failed to notice is that whether the conflict is genuine or not depends on how explanation 
interacts with truth functions, and in particular with conjunction. For the outcome of the previous 
section is that PSR entails that there is an omni-explainer—and so conflicts with Irreflexivity—
provided we assume that Dissection is true. In my view, this result puts much dialectical pressure on 
Dissection—which I shall examine in the next section—as Dissection seems to be the root of the 
explanatory universalist’s troubles. 
But as I suspect that some explanatory universalists may welcome the result that PSR yields 
that there is an omni-explainer, I suspect that some explanatory universalists may be tempted to 
commit themselves to the rejection of Irreflexivity. For, undeniably, the claim that there is a certain 
being whose existence is self-explanatory is a traditional thesis that classical explanatory 
universalists embraced and aimed to demonstrate. My purpose in this section is to explain why I 
believe that this reaction to the deduction of an omni-explainer from PSR is misguided. For I shall 
argue that explanatory universalists should not allow for violations of Irreflexivity. If I am right, 
then my defence of Irreflexivity justifies the view that explanatory universalists should not welcome 
a commitment to the existence of an omni-explainer. For if PSR entails that there is an omni-
explainer, Irreflexivity leads to the conclusion that PSR is false. 
My argument for Irreflexivity consists of two steps. In section 3.1, I shall argue that, on the 
assumption that PSR yields that there is an omni-explainer, the most natural and plausible way to 
relax the principle of irreflexivity of explanation yields the counterintuitive view that 
necessitarianism is true.  In section 3.2, I shall offer a general argument in favour of the view that 
there is no legitimate way of relaxing the ban on self-explanations. In light of my defence of 
Irreflexivity, the existence of an omni-explainer is inadmissible. So the present section is aimed to 
strengthen the argument according to which PSR yields that there is an omni-explainer. 
Nevertheless, this argument is not irresistible, or so I shall argue in section 4. 
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3.1. Necessitarianism  
The view that we can relax the ban on self-explanations seems to be shared by Peter van Inwagen 
who writes:  
 
Secondly, no contingent state of affairs may be its own sufficient reason. This would seem to be an 
essential feature of the concept of a sufficient reason. (I introduce the qualification ‘contingent’ in 
order to accommodate those who hold that a necessary state of affairs is its own sufficient reason. 
Whether or not this is so will make no difference to our argument.) (van Inwagen 1983, p. 203) 
 
According to van Inwagen’s suggestion, adequate answers to the General Explanation Question 
should not assume Irreflexivity among their axioms or theorems. Instead what they should assume is 
the following qualified version of this principle: 
 
Contingent Irreflexivity: For any contingent propositions x and y, if x is an explanation for y, 
then x ≠ y. 
 
The thought seems to be that while, given Irreflexivity, no proposition whatsoever is its own 
explanation, Contingent Irreflexivity leaves open the possibility that some necessary proposition 
explains itself, a possibility some theists take seriously. Van Inwagen’s suggestion appears to me as 
the most plausible and natural restriction of the principle that explanation is irreflexive. It is worthy 
of interest here because Contingent Irreflexivity also leaves open the possibility that, if there is an 
omni-explainer, this proposition is a necessary truth that explains itself. 
But the problem with van Inwagen’s suggestion is that, given the deduction of an omni-
explainer from PSR, if Contingent Irreflexivity is assumed, PSR yields Necessitarianism: 
 
Necessitarianism: For any proposition x, if x is true then x is necessarily true. 
  
13 
 
This thesis should be associated with the 17th century Dutch rationalist Spinoza (1985, pp. 433-9), 
who defended the thesis that nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are of necessity.  
Suppose that there is an omni-explainer O. Then, given Contingent Irreflexivity, O cannot be 
a contingent truth. So O must be a necessary truth. But if so, on the further assumption that any 
explanans strictly implies its explananda, every truth is necessary. Hence, if PSR is assumed to 
yield the conclusion that there is an omni-explainer, the further assumption that Contingent 
Irreflexivity is true (and Irreflexivity is false) leads to the conclusion that PSR entails 
Necessitarianism. 
 Philosophers are familiar with the belief that PSR entails Necessitarianism because of a 
famous argument proposed by van Inwagen and others.12 The main difference between my 
deduction of Necessitarianism from PSR and van Inwagen’s argument is that the latter relies on the 
assumption that the conjunction of all contingent truths can be formed, while mine doesn’t rely on 
such an assumption.13 This difference is important because one can resist the assumption that the 
conjunction of all contingent truths can be formed (Oppy 2006, p. 281).  
Another advantage of my derivation of Necessitarianism from PSR compared to van 
Inwagen’s original argument is that it allows me to emphasise that restricting the principle of 
irreflexivity of explanation to contingent truths is essential in order to deduce Necessitarianism 
from PSR. For a crucial step in the derivation of Necessitarianism from PSR is the deduction of the 
                                                          
12 See also Hill (1982) and Bennett (1984, p. 115). Van Inwagen’s argument runs as follows. Assume that PSR is true 
and Necessitarianism is false. Necessitarianism being false there are contingent truths. Form c the conjunction of all 
contingent truths. Conjunctions of contingent truths are contingent and true; hence c is a contingent truth. By PSR there 
is an explanation, say e, for c. Since explanation is factive, e is true. If so, e is either necessarily or contingently true. If e 
is necessarily true, then, on the further assumption that any explanans strictly implies its explananda, so are c and its 
conjuncts. But this result conflicts with our assumption that there are contingent truths of which c is the conjunction. So 
e must be contingent. But if e is a contingent truth, e is a conjunct of c. By Dissection we can derive that e explains 
itself, contrary to the assumption that no contingent proposition is self-explanatory. So e must be a necessary truth. Yet 
we have already seen that this result conflicts with the assumption that Necessitarianism is false. Therefore, if PSR is 
true so is Necessitarianism.  
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claim that there is an omni-explainer. Yet if Irreflexivity holds unrestrictedly, no truth whatsoever is 
an omni-explainer and so Necessitarianism cannot be deduced.14  
So, prima facie, the strategy that consists in biting the bullet in favour of the existence of an 
omni-explainer and in admitting that there may be a self-explanatory necessary truth (and no self-
explanatory contingent truth) is wildly unappealing. For this strategy yields the counterintuitive 
conclusion that Necessitarianism is true. If a commitment to PSR requires us to endorse both the 
claim that there is an omni-explainer and the claim that Necessitarianism is true, then I think that 
we might well wonder whether the game is worth the candle. For the belief that things may be 
different than they are is both deeply entrenched into our system of beliefs and well-motivated.  
But I should emphasise that Michael Della Rocca (2010), who defends PSR, thinks that the 
game is worth the candle even if PSR yields Necessitarianism. Della Rocca writes: 
  
Precisely because necessitarianism is an implication of the PSR, the intuitive pressure leading to the 
PSR is intuitive pressure leading to necessitarianism. A clear-headed proponent of the PSR can be ex-
pected to embrace necessitarianism for precisely this reason. (Spinoza certainly did.) “Oh, that 
necessitarianism stuff is something I knew about all along,” the rationalist might say. (Della Rocca 
2010, p. 9) 
 
According to Della Rocca, the deduction of Necessitarianism from PSR merely confirms what he 
knew all along, namely that Necessitarianism is part of the explanatory universalist doctrine. Then 
since he thinks that PSR is intuitive he concludes that Necessitarianism is intuitive too. This is 
provocative. But whatever one’s views about the plausibility of Necessitarianism, I believe that 
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Della Rocca’s “clear-headed proponent of PSR” is getting confused. For, as I have explained, the 
view that PSR implies Necessitarianism is false if no proposition whatsoever explains itself. Yet, on 
Della Rocca’s own lights, there are strong reasons to stand firm on the ban on self-explanations. I 
shall discuss these reasons to maintain Irreflexivity in section 3.2. My argument will allow me to 
reject further restrictions of the principle that explanation is irreflexive that have been defended by 
Hud Hudson (1997) and Alexander Pruss (2006).  
 
3.2. Standing firm on the ban on self-explanations 
Several explanatory universalists have committed themselves to failures of Irreflexivity. First, Della 
Rocca has endorsed the view that Necessitarianism follows from PSR. Yet since Necessitarianism 
follows from PSR only if we admit a self-explanatory necessary truth (see above), Della Rocca’s 
position is coherent only if he denies that Irreflexivity holds unrestrictedly. Other explanatory 
universalists have thought that they can avoid the conclusion that Necessitarianism follows from 
PSR by admitting some further violations of Irreflexivity. Hudson (1997) has proposed to admit true 
necessary falsehoods in order to avoid a commitment to Necessitarianism. He argues that the 
existence of true necessary falsehoods appears justified if we endorse David Lewis’s (1986a) 
genuine modal realism and the doctrine of unrestricted composition.
15
 Then if we assume that the 
omni-explainer is neither a contingent nor a necessary truth but a true necessary falsehood, 
Necessitarianism does not follow from the claim that there is an omni-explainer. Yet if the omni-
explainer is a true necessary falsehood, then there is a self-explanatory true necessary falsehood. 
Finally, Alexander Pruss has maintained that there is a good candidate for a self-explanatory 
contingent truth (2006, pp. 97-125). Pruss's candidate is a proposition that represents a libertarian 
free action of creation (2006, p. 124). The situation Pruss has in mind involves a necessarily 
existing and essentially good God who, when deciding what kind of a universe to create, finds that 
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 See Feit 1998 for a reply to Hudson’s argument regarding the link between genuine modal realism and the thesis that 
there are true necessary falsehoods. 
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no world is the best of all; and so God chooses to create one of the best worlds freely (2006, pp. 
116-7). Thus Pruss’s cosmological scenario implies the rejection of Contingent Irreflexivity. 
I believe that the general strategy of these explanatory universalists is misguided because I 
contend that we are justified in maintaining that Irreflexivity is true.
16
 So here I shall offer a general 
argument for Irreflexivity following which no violation of Irreflexivity should be allowed. 
Several writers have emphasised that explanation and cognate notions are fundamentally 
irreflexive. For instance, Oppy writes:  
 
If one asks “Why S?”, one can never be satisfied with the alleged explanation “Because S!” (...). It is 
true that in colloquial language it is common for people to say that something or other is “self-
explanatory”; but what they mean when they say this is usually that the thing in question is obvious, 
not that it literally provides its own explanation. (...) As intimated above, “A because A” is always an 
explanatory solecism; hence “A explains A” can never be true. (Oppy 2006, pp. 277-8) 
 
If “p because p” is a mistake of the grammar of explanation, then Irreflexivity must be a formal 
truth that holds of any proposition. In a similar vein, Benjamin Schnieder (2011, p. 454) claims that 
“¬(p because p)” is a theorem of his logic for ‘because’. Last but not least, Kit Fine (2012, p. 5) 
assumes as a constitutive rule of inference of his pure logic of ground that strict ground operators 
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 If pressed to explain why I am not convinced by Pruss's particular alleged counterexample to Contingent Irreflexivity, 
I should say that the reason why, in his scenario, God acted indifferently is that no world is the best overall. Since the 
proposition that there is no best world overall is undoubtedly distinct from that representing God’s action, I don’t see 
why we should admit a violation of Irreflexivity here. Some may reply that the proposition that no candidate for creation 
is the best universe overall does not suffice to fully explain why it is this world, instead of another one, that has been 
created. I could not agree more. But if so, the right conclusion is that Pruss’s scenario is a counterexample to PSR. 
Modern explanatory universalists would have agreed with me on this conclusion. Spinoza himself denied that God has a 
free will on the basis of PSR. But he also denied that the world is created. Leibniz, on the other hand, maintained that 
PSR entails that some world is better than any other world. Otherwise, God would have no reason to act: “And to say 
that the mind will act when it has reasons to act, even if the ways of acting are absolutely indifferent—this is to speak 
again very superficially and quite indefensibly. For you don’t have a sufficient reason to act unless you have a sufficient 
reason to act in precisely such-and-such a way (…) So when there’s a sufficient reason to do any particular thing, 
there’s also a sufficient reason to do it in a certain particular way, which means that the various alternative ways of 
doing it are not indifferent. . . .” (Alexander 1956, Leibniz’s 5th paper). 
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are non-circular, i.e. that nothing strictly grounds itself. The notion of a strict ground is firmly 
connected to that of an explanation. As Fine writes 
 
We might think of the strict grounds as moving us down in the explanatory hierarchy. They always 
take us to a lower level of explanation and, for this reason, a truth can never be a strict ground for 
itself. (Fine 2012, 3) 
 
Here Fine appears to justify the non-circularity of the strict ground operator in terms of the 
irreflexivity of explanation. So, contra these explanatory universalists that I mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, there seems to be a wide consensus in contemporary metaphysics in 
favour of the view that explanation and cognate notions are irreducibly irreflexive. If this consensus 
is justified, we should not relax the ban on self-explanations.  
But is it justified? I think so. Consider Della Rocca’s account of the rejection of explanations 
by means of Aristotelian forms by early modern philosophers: 
 
Such forms were introduced—or so the caricature goes—to explain changes in the world. A pan 
becomes hot, for example, because it acquires the form of heat. Such explanation came to be seen and 
is still seen by most as bankrupt. To explain something’s becoming hot in terms of its acquisition of 
the form of heat is trivial: in order to explain why the pan becomes hot, we need to appeal to features 
not so closely tied—as the form of heat is—to the phenomenon to be explained. If explanation of a 
certain phenomenon by means of such forms were the whole explanation, then this phenomenon 
would remain inexplicable. (Della Rocca 2010, p. 3; my emphasis) 
 
Della Rocca's account seems correct to me. But why is it that, if explaining p in terms of q is trivial, 
p remains unexplained? This is so because a plausible requirement on explanations is that, in order 
for q to be an explanation for p, q must be informative about p.
17
 Given that by definition an alleged 
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 An instance of this principle is Lewis’s (1986b, pp. 217-8) claim that a causal explanation must be informative about 
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explanation that is trivial is not informative, no genuine explanation is trivial. But why are alleged 
explanations by Aristotelian forms trivial? Della Rocca thinks that they are so because he maintains 
the following: 
 
Distance: for any x and y, if x and y are too closely tied, then x is neither an explanation for y 
nor is y an explanation for x. 
 
What ‘closely tied’ means here is vague. Still there is a clear connection between the notion of an 
alleged explanation that is insufficiently informative and that of an alleged explanans that is too 
closely tied to its explanandum. If the transmission of information is a necessary requirement on 
explanations, so is Distance. Distance entails, however, that no proposition whatsoever can be its 
own explanation. This is because, for every proposition x, no proposition is more closely tied to x 
than x itself. So here is one way of justifying Irreflexivity: the requirement of transmission of 
information justifies Distance, which itself justifies Irreflexivity. I believe that this way of reasoning 
is correct. Therefore, I contend that we should stand firm on the ban on self-explanations. 
But if so, Della Rocca seems to be hoist by his own petard. Given his commitment to 
Distance, he must commit himself to Irreflexivity. But then his open-minded attitude towards 
Necessitarianism is irrelevant. For given Irreflexivity, if the derivation of an omni-explainer is 
sound, PSR does not entail Necessitarianism (see section 3.1). Since I agree with Della Rocca that 
Distance is true, biting the bullet in favour of Necessitarianism as he does is not a strategy that I can 
recommend to any “clear-headed” proponent of PSR. 
Moreover and more importantly, since I maintain Irreflexivity, I contend that explanatory 
universalists cannot endorse the claim that there is an omni-explainer. For, given Irreflexivity, 
explanatory universalism is refuted if PSR implies that there is an omni-explainer. According to me 
then, there is only one adequate way explanatory universalists can evade this problem: they must 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the causal history of the explanandum. 
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solve it by showing that PSR does not imply that there is an omni-explainer. But the claim that there 
is an omni-explainer follows from PSR by Dissection. This means that explanatory universalism is 
false if Dissection is true. Fortunately, Dissection is not true, or so I shall argue in the next section. 
 
4. Conjunction and explanation 
I do not believe that the deduction of an omni-explainer from PSR is cogent because this deduction 
essentially relies on Dissection, namely the claim that for any propositions x, y, and z, if z is an 
explanation for (x & y), then z is an explanation for x and z is an explanation for y. Yet explanatory 
universalists can legitimately deny Dissection, or so I shall argue. 
Whether Dissection is true depends on how the explanation operator interacts with truth 
functions, and in particular with conjunction. So let us assume that there is a consequence operator 
* such that, necessarily, for any propositions x and y, x explains y iff x is true, x ≠ y, and x * y. 
Then whether Dissection is true depends on the strength of *. Of course, Dissection is true if * 
is assumed to be as strong as material implication or classical entailment. But there is a powerful 
reason to think that * must be stronger than both classical material implication and classical 
entailment. This reason has to do with relevance. Intuitively, for a proposition to explain another, 
the former must contribute to the obtaining of the latter. In other words, the explanans must be 
relevant to the explanandum. However, if * is as weak as classical material implication or 
classical entailment, then a true proposition may turn out to have a fully irrelevant explanans. If * 
is understood in terms of classical material implication, then the fact that François Hollande is the 
actual president of France explains why the Earth rotates towards the east. If * is understood in 
terms of classical entailment and there are both contingent and necessary truths, then every 
necessary truth, and a fortiori every logical necessity, turns out to be explained by every contingent 
truth. It is for such reasons that the claim that explanation is classically monotonic, i. e. the claim 
that any explanans explains all the (classical) logical consequences of what it explains, appears 
implausible. For this claim generates fully irrelevant explanations. So the claim that explanation is 
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classically monotonic does not constitute a legitimate reason to assume that Dissection is true. 
A natural thought, then, is to conceive of * in terms of relevant implication. The suggestion 
is that, for any distinct and true propositions x and y, x is a sufficient reason or full explanation for y 
if and only if x is a true relevant sufficient condition for y, and x ≠ y. This suggestion entails that 
Dissection is true. For, for any x, y, and z, if z relevantly implies (x & y), z relevantly implies x and 
relevantly implies y by suffixing and &-elimination.
18
 However, I shall argue that there are good 
reasons to maintain that explanation is stronger than relevant implication. These reasons imply that 
Dissection is false.  
Consider the following quotation from the famous explanatory universalist Leibniz: 
 
Now, by that single principle, viz. that there ought to be a sufficient reason why things should be so, 
and not otherwise, one may demonstrate the being of a God, and all the other parts of metaphysics or 
natural theology; and even, in some measure, those principles of natural philosophy, that are 
independent upon mathematics: I mean the dynamical principles, or the principles of force. (Alexander 
1956, 2
nd
 paper, §1; my emphasis) 
  
According to Leibniz, a sufficient reason or full explanation for a proposition must tell us why 
things are so and not otherwise. This means that, for Leibniz, a genuine explanation for a 
proposition must be discriminatory: it must discriminate the actual situation from counterfactual 
ones.
19
 Such an account of explanation requires that, in order for a proposition to explain another, 
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 The suffixing axiom of relevant logic states that, for any x and y, if x relevantly implies y, then, for any z, if y 
relevantly implies z then x relevantly implies z. The &-elimination axiom states that, for any x and y, (x & y) relevantly 
implies x and relevantly implies y. 
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 On the discriminatory feature of explanation see also the quote from Leibniz in note 16 above. Let me emphasise that 
Leibniz maintained that there are necessary truths. So if his principle of sufficient reason is meant to apply to these 
truths as well, as it certainly is, then his requirement that explanations tell us why things are so, and not otherwise, 
implies us to have a look at impossible counterfactual situations. These situations may correspond to the non-normal 
worlds, or “logic fictions”, of the semantics for relevance logic; see Priest 2008. As a matter of fact, Leibniz does 
consider a world that is, according to him, such a logic fiction when he replies to Clarke. He calls such worlds merely 
“abstractly possible” and maintains that there are some abstract possibilities that fail to be genuine metaphysical 
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the former proposition must be relevant to the latter. However, requiring that the explanans contains 
some chunk of relevant information about the explanandum is not enough if what we want is to fully 
explain why things are so and not otherwise. For let us suppose that p relevantly implies q while r is 
irrelevant to q (where p, q, and r are three distinct truths). Then (p & r) is a true proposition that 
contains some relevant piece of information about q. Yet if one attempts to explain why q is the 
case by merely appealing to (p & r), one fails to say whether q would be true or false if p were false 
and r were true or whether q would be true if p were true and r were false, despite the fact that these 
questions have a determinate answer. Merely explaining q in terms of (p & r) does not suffice to 
discriminate the actual state of the universe from counterfactual states of the universe because it 
does not tell us on what, within (p & r), q genuinely depends. This is the reason why (p & r) is not a 
sufficient reason, or genuine explanation, for q on Leibniz’s account of a sufficient reason. But if 
so, the Leibnizian account of explanation is incompatible with Dissection. For Dissection typically 
generates alleged explanations that contain chunks of information that are irrelevant to the 
explanandum.  
Let me assume that the following is a satisfactory explanation of why a is black: a is black 
because a is a raven and genetic mechanisms X occur within all ravens that are responsible for 
biochemical reactions Y which produce their distinctive black pigmentation. And let me assume for 
the sake of the argument that the fact that I placed a mug on my desk explains that there is a mug on 
my desk. On these assumptions, the following appears to be a plausible explanation of why a is 
black and there is a mug on my desk: a is black and there is a mug on my desk because a is a raven, 
genetic mechanisms X occur in all ravens which are responsible for biochemical reactions Y which 
produce their distinctive black pigmentation, and I placed a mug on my desk. So by Dissection we 
can derive that a is black because a is a raven, genetic mechanisms X occur in all ravens which are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
possibilities because they violate PSR: “This supposition of two indiscernibles—e.g. two pieces of matter that are 
perfectly alike—does indeed seem to be abstractly possible, but it isn’t consistent with the order of things, or with 
God’s wisdom, which doesn’t allow anything without reason. Ordinary lay-people fancy such things because they rest 
content with incomplete notions, thus regarding something as outright possible on the grounds that it is abstractly 
possible.” Alexander 1956, Leibniz’s 5th reply. 
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responsible for biochemical reactions Y which produce their distinctive black pigmentation, and I 
placed a mug on my desk. But it seems that a would still be black in a counterfactual situation in 
which I had placed no mug on my desk. That I placed a mug on my desk is irrelevant to explain 
why a is black. Indeed, knowing that I placed a mug on my desk does not increase our 
understanding of why a is black. This information seems parasitic on what explains that a is black 
instead of being part of a genuine explanation of why a is black. So it is counterintuitive to think 
that the proposition that I placed a mug on my desk can take place in a genuine explanation of why 
a is black. I believe that the Leibnizian account of explanation is motivated by such intuitions.  
In the previous example, Dissection yields an alleged explanation of why a is black that does 
not tell us whether a would be black in a situation in which I placed no mug on my desk, although 
this question has a determinate answer. In general, the point is that for any propositions w, x, y, and 
z such that w explains x and y explains z, if we assume that (w & y) explains (x & z), then Dissection 
entails that (w & y) explains both x and z despite the fact that y may be irrelevant to x and w to z. In 
such a case, explaining x in terms of (w & y) does not tell us whether x would be true if w were true 
and y were false, and it does not tell us whether x would be true if w were false and y were true, 
although these questions have a determinate answer. So Dissection generates alleged explanations 
that do not tell us how the explanandum is connected with the alleged explanans because they 
contain too much information. According to the Leibnizian account of explanation, such alleged 
explanations are mere pseudo explanations. For they fail to explain why things are so, and not 
otherwise. So Dissection is incompatible with the Leibnizian account of explanation that I favour.  
But is the Leibnizian account of explanation plausible? James Woodward has argued that a 
successful scientific explanation should not merely provide a nomologically sufficient condition for 
the explanandum, but should be such that it “could be used to answer a set of what-if-things-had-
been-different questions” that “insure that the explanans will perspicuously identify those 
conditions which are relevant to the explanandum being what it is” (Woodward 1979, p. 55) (see 
also Woodward 2003). The claim is that a successful act of explanation should not only tell us that 
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the explanandum derives from the alleged explanans but should tell us how the explanandum 
depends on the alleged explanans (Hitchcock 2005, p. 112). Of course, what Woodward and 
Hitchcock are talking about here are linguistic acts of explanation rather than the ontological and 
objective notion of explanation that is relevant to the purpose of this paper and is independent of 
any such act. But linguistic acts of explanation are intended to grasp, or to make intelligible, the 
explanatory connections that take place in the world. So it is reasonable to think that, if Woodward 
and Hitchcock are right about the fact that acts of explanation are successful only if they tell us how 
the explanandum depends on the alleged explanans, then this can only be because something like 
the Leibnizian fine-grained account of explanatory connections in the world is true.20 
In this section, I have argued that the great explanatory universalist Leibniz is committed to 
the view that a proposition is not merely another true proposition that relevantly implies the latter. 
Then I have argued that the Leibnizian fine-grained view about explanation is incompatible with 
Dissection. The view is that a genuine explanation must only contain those true sufficient 
conditions that are relevant to the obtaining of the explanandum in order to discriminate why things 
are so and not otherwise. Since Dissection typically generates alleged explanations that contain 
superfluous information, it is false on the Leibnizian view. Finally, I have emphasised that the 
Leibnizian view on explanation that I favour is supported by recent considerations concerning the 
nature of scientific explanations. Therefore, explanatory universalists need not be, and I say are not, 
committed to Dissection. Since the deduction of an omni-explainer from PSR essentially relies on 
Dissection, I conclude that explanatory universalism is not refuted by this argument.  
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 Gideon Rosen (2010, pp. 116-7) also seems to share the view that Dissection is false. Rosen does not discuss 
Dissection but the related principle that, for any truths x and y, if x explains y, then, for any z, (x & z) explains y, which I 
shall call Strengthening (Rosen calls it “monotonicity”, but I prefer to reserve the label “monotonicity” to describe 
another principle). But Rosen’s reasons to deny Strengthening appear to me as close, if not identical, to my reasons to 
deny Dissection. Moreover, the rejection of Strengthening appears to imply the rejection of Dissection. See also Guigon 
2009 and Guigon 2011 for other arguments against Dissection understood as a principle about the bringing about 
operator and causal explanation respectively. 
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5. Coda 
I would like to conclude this article by considering a weaker version of Dissection that is not 
challenged by the argument of the previous section and which seems plausible to me: 
 
W-Dissection: For any propositions x, y, and z, if z is an explanation for (x & y), then if z is a 
conjunction, then either z is an explanation for x and z is an explanation for y, or some 
conjunct of z explains x and some conjunct of z explains y; if z is not a conjunction, z is an 
explanation for x and z is an explanation for y.
21
 
 
I am not going to argue for W-Dissection here. The reason why I find this principle congenial is that 
I cannot think of any good reason to reject it. Notice also that the argument of the previous section 
would justify a general account of the interaction of explanation with truth functions that does not 
restrict itself to propositions that exhibit a particular syntactic structure (viz., conjunctions).
22
 But 
for reasons of space, I shall not pursue this line of inquiry here. The issue I shall focus on is whether 
PSR still yields an omni-explainer if we substitute W-Dissection for Dissection. I shall argue that it 
doesn’t.  
When casting the deduction of an omni-explainer from the assumption that there are collective 
omni-explainers, I assumed that there are only two collective omni-explainers: r and s. Now 
suppose that r is a conjunctive truth having exactly two conjuncts: u and v. And suppose that s is not 
a conjunctive truth. Then if we substitute W-Dissection for Dissection, step (4) of the argument 
must be replaced by  
 
(4’) Er(p & q)  (Erp  Eup  Evp) 
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 I am greatly thankful to Natalja Deng for having suggested this weaker version of Dissection to me. 
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 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for stressing this point. 
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But (7)—the claim that either r or s is an omni-explainer tout court—does not follow from (4’) and 
the assumption that s is not conjunctive. Instead what follows from (4’) is  
 
(7’) (p  (Erp  Eup  Evp))  (q  Esq) 
 
Since the first disjunct of (7’) is compatible with (1)—the claim that p is true but not explained by 
r—it does not follow from (7’) that there is an omni-explainer tout court. This means that, if we 
substitute W-Dissection for Dissection in the deduction of an omni-explainer from PSR, the 
conclusion that there is an omni-explainer does not follow, and PSR no more conflicts with the 
principle that explanation is irreflexive. 
Still there is something important about the interaction of PSR, Irreflexivity, and W-Dissection 
that this argument reveals. If (7’) is true and (7) is false, then by W-Dissection it follows that (p & 
q) is not explained by s; otherwise, since s is not a conjunctive truth, the second conjunct of (7’) 
would be true contrary to (2), namely the assumption that s does not explain q. So (p & q) is 
explained by r. Since there is no omni-explainer tout court, let me assume, this means that at least 
one proposition, either p or q, is neither explained by r nor by s but by a further proposition: a 
conjunct of r that is neither identical to r nor to s. But if so, it is not the case that r and s collectively 
explain all truths. There are more collective omni-explainers than we started with. Isn’t this 
puzzling?  
Yes and no. In fact, I would not be surprised if it could be shown that, for any number n, if we 
assume as a working hypothesis that there are n collective omni-explainers, then PSR, Irreflexivity, 
and W-Dissection together entail that there are more than n collective omni-explainers. If this could 
be shown, then this would mean that the limit of the set of collective omni-explainers is not 
attainable, or that this set can never be fulfilled. Such a result should not surprise us too much 
because we are familiar with the idea that the conjunction of PSR and Irreflexivity entails that there 
is no actual ultimate level of explanation. More astonishing, I suggest, is the result that our 
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assumptions about how explanation combines with conjunction play a determining role in whether 
PSR and Irreflexivity together entail that there is no actual ultimate level of explanation. Now it is 
true that philosophers tend to repudiate the claim that there is no actual fundamental level of 
explanation.
23
 But, looking at physical cosmology and causal explanation, I wonder if the demand 
for an actual fundamental level of explanation is not just another dogma of metaphysics.  
Standard or Friedmann-Robertson-Walker (FRW) big bang models imply that for every time t 
there is a time t' that is prior to t and is such that the state of the universe at t' is a cause of the state 
of the universe at t. In this way, “the principle Every event has a cause ... is satisfied in the FRW big 
bang models” (Earman 1995, p. 209). If every event has a cause, every proposition that represents 
the occurrence of an event has a causal explanation. So PSR, understood as a principle about causal 
explanation, is true within standard big bang models. In these models, the structure of time is 
continuous and open.
24
 This entails that no state of the universe is a cause of itself and that no 
proposition is its own causal explanation. So Irreflexivity, understood as a principle about causal 
explanation, is also true in standard big bang models. Accordingly, there is no actual fundamental 
cause, no actual first state of the universe, and so no actual fundamental level of causal explanation 
in FRW models. But what of the big bang itself then? Well, the whole point is that, in FRW models, 
the big bang singularity at t = 0 is excluded from the class of actual moments of time. The big bang 
singularity is an ideal rather than an actual limit of time. Physicists interpret this claim as meaning 
that, according to FRW big bang models, the cosmic time interval is open in the past. But this does 
not mean that time is infinite in FRW big bang models. For the duration of the past interval is still 
finite, around fifteen billions years. In a similar vein, a chain of explanations can be open without 
being infinite, and, strictly speaking, the combination of PSR and Irreflexivity merely commit us to 
such an open chain of explanations.
25
 Since the past interval is finite, it is impossible to travel 
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 Cf. Meyer 2012 on the interaction between closed models of time and the principle of sufficient reason. In his article, 
Meyer rejects PSR on the misleading grounds that PSR entails Necessitarianism. 
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 A chain of explanations is open if for any point x in this chain, there is a real number r > 0 such that the interval (x + 
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infinitely in a regular way into the past. Still, in some sense, there are infinitely descending causal 
chains, and so infinitely descending chains of causal explanation, in FRW big bang models. For the 
causal chain asymptotically approaches the big bang singularity without attaining it. The closer we 
are to the big bang, the smaller is the temporal extension of the state of the universe. In this way, as 
we are approaching the big bang singularity we are approaching the limit of the set of collective 
causal omni-explainers, and so getting closer to fulfilling this set. But it can never be fulfilled as the 
limit of the set, the big bang singularity, is not attainable. Therefore, standard big bang models are 
plausible models of the universe that provide us with an acceptable understanding of what a world 
without an actual ultimate level of (causal) explanation looks like.  
 
In closing, in this article I have defended explanatory universalism, the view that PSR is true, 
against an argument that purports to show that PSR entails that some truth explains every truth. This 
argument constitutes a challenge to explanatory universalism because it implies that PSR conflicts 
with the principle that explanation is irreflexive, which I have maintained against other proponents 
of PSR. I have argued that the derivation of an omni-explainer from PSR does not refute 
explanatory universalism because this argument essentially appeals to Dissection which explanatory 
universalists can legitimately deny. According to me, explanatory universalists should maintain that 
a genuine explanation of a fact must contain no information that does not contribute to the 
explanation of this fact. If this is correct, then W-Dissection, from which it does not follow that PSR 
entails that there is an omni-explainer, appears more plausible than Dissection. 
Naturally, if my defence of explanatory universalism commits me to the claim that there is no 
actual ultimate level of explanation, I do not expect it to gain large popularity among philosophers. 
This is a venerable trilemma: the principle of sufficient reason, the unrestricted ban on self-
explanations, and the claim that there is an actual fundamental level of explanation cannot all be 
true together. The tradition from Aquinas to Leibniz contends that PSR is true and that there is an 
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actual self-explanatory level of explanation, thereby rejecting that explanation is necessarily 
irreflexive. On the other hand, many contemporary metaphysicians maintain that there is an actual 
fundamental level of explanation and that nothing is its own explanation, thereby rejecting PSR. But 
in this domain the metaphysician can learn from physical cosmology. And if standard big bang 
models are plausible representations of physical reality, then we must acknowledge that a theory 
that commits us to PSR, to the ban on self-explanations, and to the denial of an actual fundamental 
level of explanation is not implausible. In any case, such a theory is not refuted by the argument 
according to which PSR entails that there is an omni-explainer.26 
 
APPENDIX 
When stating the derivation of an omni-explainer from the claim that there are collective omni-
explainers and Dissection in section 2, I have assumed for ease of exposition that the set of 
collective omni-explainers is finite. But since, given the content of section 5, it does not seem 
implausible that explanatory universalists are committed to infinitely many collective omni-
explainers, one may legitimately wonder whether the claim that there is an omni-explainer still 
follows from PSR and Dissection when an infinite set of collective omni-explainers is assumed.  
An objector may think that it doesn’t on the grounds that we can only form conjunctions of a 
finite number of propositions. Yet since our argument proceeds by mapping each of the collective 
omni-explainers onto a true proposition that it does not explain and in forming the conjunction of 
these mapped-to propositions, if there are infinitely many collective omni-explainers, this 
conjunction may have an infinite number of conjuncts.  
 Here is a model to illustrate this problem. Let ‘G’ stand for the set of collective omni-
explainers and suppose that G = {…, o3, o2, o1}, which is a backward infinite series and where ‘o1’, 
‘o2’, ‘o3’, etc. are names for collective omni-explainers. Suppose that propositions have truth-
                                                          
26
 This paper has benefited greatly from discussions with the members of the eidos Group, the Swiss Centre in 
Metaphysics. I thank them all. I am especially thankful to my colleagues Natalja Deng, Fabrice Correia, Alexander 
Skiles, and Alexander Bown. I am also greatly indebted to Karen Bennett, Baptiste Le Bihan, Stephan Leuenberger, 
Clare Mac Cumhaill, Ulrich Meyer, Graham Peebles, Johannes Stern, and Cain Todd and to anonymous referees for 
OSM for their useful comments. 
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functional structure, and that each member of S is atomic. Now suppose that each oi in the series 
explains each later member in the series. For instance, o2 explains o1, o3 explains o2  and o1, and so 
on. Suppose also that there is another proposition p outside the series that is explained by o1 but 
which does not explain anything. In this model, for any collective omni-explainer oi, the 
propositions that oi does not explain always come lower in the series. So we can map each of the 
collective omni-explainers onto its immediate ancestor for the need of the proof: o1 can be mapped 
onto o2 , o2 can be mapped onto o3 and, in general, we can map any oi onto oi – 1. Now the problem is 
that for the purpose of the argument we would need to be able to form the conjunction of these 
mapped-to propositions. But since the set of collective omni-explainers is infinite, the set of 
mapped-to propositions—which is simply the set of immediate ancestors of every collective omni-
explainer here—is itself infinite. So if, as my objector thinks, we cannot form infinite conjunctions, 
we cannot form the conjunction of mapped-to propositions. If so, the deduction of an omni-
explainer from PSR is blocked.27  
 But even if it is assumed that we cannot form the relevant infinite conjunctions, we can still 
express them by appealing to a truth predicate. The thought that the main purpose of the truth 
predicate is to represent such infinite conjunctions is traditional among deflationists about truth.28 In 
this case, the idea is to replace Dissection by: 
 
 Dissection#: S z (Ez(the proposition that all the members of S are true)  xS Ezx); 
  
where Dissection# reads “for any set S of propositions and any proposition z, if z explains the 
proposition that all the members of S are true, then z explains all the members of S”. On the 
assumption that we can use the truth predicate to represent infinite conjunctions, Dissection# should 
                                                          
27
 This model was brought to my attention by an anonymous referee to whom I am grateful.  
28
 See, for instance, Quine 1970, p. 12 : “We may affirm the single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by quotation or 
by the truth predicate; but if we want to affirm some infinite lot of sentences, then the truth predicate has its use.” See 
also Halbach 1999. 
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be as plausible as Dissection.  
 The argument then goes as follows. Let, again, G be a backward infinite series of collective 
omni-explainers. Suppose for reductio that none of the members of G is an omni-explainer tout 
court. Then to each oi in G we can associate a true proposition f(oi) that oi does not explain. Take U 
the set of all f(oi)s such that oi is in G. By Dissection#, we get: 
 
 (#): oiG (Eoi(the proposition that all the members of U are true)  xU Eoix). 
 
Now since the members of G are collective omni-explainers, there is a member oj of G such that oj 
explains the proposition that all the members of U are true. By (#) it follows that, for all xU, oj 
explains x. But since f(oj) is in U, we get the conclusion: oj explains f(oj). Yet by assumption f(oj) is 
not explained by oj. Contradiction. Hence, given Dissection#, some member of G is an omni-
explainer tout court. Q.E.D. 
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